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Abstract
Today’s critical infrastructures like the Power Grid are
essentially physical processes controlled by computers con-
nected by networks. They are usually as vulnerable as any
other interconnected computer system, but their failure has
a high socio-economic impact. The paper describes a new
construct for the protection of these infrastructures, based
on distributed algorithms and mechanisms implemented be-
tween a set of devices called CIS. CIS collectively ensure
that incoming/outgoing traffic satisfies the security policy of
an organization in the face of accidents and attacks. How-
ever, they are not simple firewalls but distributed protec-
tion devices based on a sophisticated access control model.
Likewise, they seek perpetual unattended correct operation,
so they are designed with intrusion-tolerant capabilities and
hardened with proactive recovery. The paper discusses the
rationale behind the use of CIS to improve the resilience of
critical infrastructures and presents a design using logical
replication based on virtual machines.
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures like the power, water and gas dis-
tribution networks have a fundamental role in modern life.
These infrastructures are essentially physical/mechanical
processes controlled electronically. The control systems,
usually called SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Ac-
quisition) or PCS (Process Control System), are com-
posed by computers interconnected by computer networks
[25, 40].
In recent years these systems evolved in several aspects
that greatly increased their exposure to cyber-attacks com-
ing from the Internet. Firstly, the computers, networks and
protocols in those control systems are no longer proprietary
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the FCT through project POSI/EIA/60334/2004 (RITAS) and the Large-
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but standard PCs and networks (e.g., wired and wireless
Ethernet), and the protocols are often encapsulated on top
of TCP/IP. Secondly, these networks are usually connected
to the Internet indirectly through the corporate network or
to other networks using modems and data links. Thirdly,
several infrastructures are being interconnected creating a
complexity that is hard to manage [38].
Therefore these infrastructures have a level of vulnera-
bility similar to other systems connected to the Internet, but
the socio-economic impact of their failure can be huge. This
scenario, reinforced by several recent incidents [42, 8], is
generating a great concern about the security of these in-
frastructures, especially at government level.
A reference architecture was recently proposed to protect
critical infrastructures, in the context of the CRUTIAL1 EU-
IST project [40]. The whole infrastructure architecture is
modeled as a WAN-of-LANs. This topology allows simple
solutions to hard problems such as legacy control subnet-
works, and interconnection of critical and non-critical traf-
fic. Typically, a critical information infrastructure is formed
by facilities, like power transformation substations or cor-
porate offices, modeled as collections of LANs and inter-
connected by a wider-area network, modeled as a WAN, in
the WAN-of-LANs model.
This architecture allows defining realms with different
levels of trustworthiness. In this paper we are interested in
the problem of protecting realms from one another, i.e., a
LAN from another LAN or from the WAN. However, given
the ease of defining LANs in today’ IP architectures (e.g.,
through Virtual switched LANs), there is virtually no re-
striction to the level of granularity of protection domains,
which can go down to a single host. In consequence, our
model and architecture allow us to deal both with outsider
threats (protecting a facility from the Internet) and insider
threats (protecting a critical host from other hosts in the
same physical facility, by locating them in different LANs).
Protection of LANs from the WAN or other LANs is
1Critical UTility InfrastructurAL Resilience: http://crutial.
cesiricerca.it.
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made by a device called CRUTIAL Information Switch
(CIS). A CIS provides two basic services: the Protection
Service (PS) and the Communication Service (CS). The PS
ensures that the incoming and outgoing traffic in/out of the
LAN satisfies the security policy of the infrastructure. The
CS supports secure communication between CIS and, ulti-
mately, between LANs. The CS provides secure channels,
reliable and atomic multicast primitives, and probabilistic
gossip-based information diffusion between CIS. Although
the CIS supports these two services, this paper presents
only the protection service, not the communication service.
Therefore, from now on “the CIS” means “the CIS Protec-
tion Service”. Figure 1 ilustrates the use of CIS protecting
several LANs of a critical infrastructure.
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Figure 1. WAN-of-LANs connected by CIS.
A CIS can not be a simple firewall since that would put
the infrastructure at most at the level of security of current
Internet systems, which is not acceptable since intrusions in
those systems are constantly being reported [19]. Instead, a
CIS is a distributed protection device based on a sophisti-
cated access control model. The main characteristics of the
CIS are the following. Firstly, it has similarities to a dis-
tributed firewall [4], since CIS can be deployed not only on
the network border but inside the networks to better protect
critical equipment. Secondly, the CIS uses a rich access
control model that takes into account the involvement of
different organizations and allows the access control rules
to depend on context information [1]. Thirdly, the CIS is
intrusion-tolerant [17, 41], i.e., it operates correctly even
if there are intrusions in some of its components and with-
stands a high degree of such hostility from the environment,
seeking unattended perpetual operation [35].
The paper is essentially about the last topic, the design of
an intrusion-tolerant CIS. The CIS is replicated in a set of
machines. If there are intrusions in some of the replicas, the
CIS masks these faults and follows its specification. This
mechanism is hardened by proactively recovering replicas
periodically [30], in order to avoid that an attacker succes-
sively corrupts replicas until it controls enough to corrupt
the behavior of the CIS. This paper extends previous work
on proactive recovery by using also reactive recovery to re-
cover replicas that are detected to be compromised.
Several intrusion-tolerant services have been proposed
in the literature, either based on Byzantine quorum systems
(BQS) [26, 44] or state machine replication (SMR) [33, 10,
2]. However, the CIS design presents two very interesting
challenges that make it essentially different from those ser-
vices. The first is that a firewall-like component has to be
transparent to protocols that pass through it, so it can not
modify the protocols themselves to obtain intrusion toler-
ance. This also means that recipient nodes will ignore any
internal CIS intrusion-tolerance mechanisms, and as such
they can not protect themselves from messages forwarded
by faulty replicas not satisfying the security policy. The
paper shows that these two challenges are not trivial and
presents a solution that is based neither on BQS nor on
SMR.
As mentioned before, the initial motivation for develop-
ing the CIS was the protection of critical infrastructures.
However, the CIS is sufficiently generic to allow its use in
other scenarios with a high level of protection requirements.
The paper has the following main contributions: (1)
it presents the design of an intrusion-tolerant firewall-like
component adequate for protecting networked infrastruc-
tures and services from outsider and insider accidental or
malicious threats, such as critical information infrastruc-
tures; (2) it proposes a novel proactive-reactive recovery
scheme and algorithm that not only proactively recovers
replicas but also forces recovery of replicas detected to be
faulty; and (3) to our knowledge it presents the first imple-
mentation of an intrusion-tolerant service in a single ma-
chine, using logical replication based on virtual machines.
The evaluation of this prototype has shown that the limited
resources of a single machine constrain the performance of
the service, but lead to an economic solution. However,
more hardware-lavish (and more performant) solutions are
not precluded, as it will be shown.
2 The CIS Protection Service
The CIS works mainly like a firewall. It captures packets
that pass through it, checks if they satisfy the security policy
being enforced, and forwards the approved packets, discard-
ing those that do not satisfy the policy. However, several
other characteristics of the CIS make it a unique protection
device. These characteristics are presented in this section.
Distributed firewall. CIS can be used in a redundant way,
enforcing the same policies in different points of the net-
work. An extreme case in the SCADA/PCS side is to have
a CIS in each gateway interconnecting each substation net-
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work, and a CIS specifically protecting each critical com-
ponent of the SCADA/PCS network. The concept is akin
to using firewalls to protect hosts instead of only network
borders [4], and is specially useful for critical information
infrastructures given their complexity and criticality, with
many routes into the control network that can not be eas-
ily closed (e.g., Internet, dial-up modems, VPNs, wireless
access points) [8].
Application-level firewall. Critical infrastructures have
many legacy components that were designed without secu-
rity in mind, thus do not employ security mechanisms like
access control and cryptography [15]. Since these security
mechanisms are not part of the SCADA/PCS protocols and
systems, which must still be protected, protection must be
deployed in some point between the infrastructure and the
hosts that access it. The CIS has to inspect and evaluate the
messages considering application-level semantics because,
as already said, the application (infrastructure) itself does
not verify it.
Rich access control model. Besides the capacity to in-
spect application-level messages, the CIS needs to support a
rich access control policy that takes into account the multi-
organizational nature of the critical infrastructures as well
as their different operational states. Taking the Power Sys-
tem as an example, there are several companies involved in
generation, transmission and distribution of energy, as well
as regulatory agencies, and several of these parties can ex-
ecute operations in the power grid. Moreover, almost all
Power System operation is based on a classical state model
of the grid [16]. In each state of this model, specific actions
must be taken (e.g., actions defined in a defense plan, to
avoid or recover from a power outage) and many of these
actions are not allowed in other states (e.g., a generator can
not be separated automatically when the Grid is in its nor-
mal state). These two complex facets of access control in
critical infrastructures require more elaborated models than
basic mandatory, discretionary or role-based access control.
To deal with this, in the architecture of CRUTIAL we adopt
a more elaborated model, OrBAC (Organization Based Ac-
cess Control) [1]. It allows the specification of security poli-
cies containing permissions, prohibitions, obligations and
recommendations, taking into account the role of the sub-
ject, who is part of an organization, the action it wants to
execute, the target object of this action, and the context in
which it is executed. An example: “In context ‘emergency’,
operators from company C can execute maintenance opera-
tions on device D.”
Intrusion-tolerant firewall. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, the level of security of current systems connected to
the Internet is not adequate for the infrastructures we are
concerned with, given their criticality. To improve the se-
curity and dependability of the CIS, it is designed to be
intrusion-tolerant [41]: it is replicated in n machines and
follows its specification as long as at most f of these ma-
chines are attacked and have their behavior corrupted. To
enhance the resilience of the CIS, we employ proactive re-
covery to periodically rejuvenate the replicas, guaranteeing
perpetual correct operation as long as no more than f repli-
cas become faulty in a given recovery period [30]. These
mechanisms can be integrated to a basic, non-replicated,
design of the CIS in an incremental way. We can first build
a non-replicated CIS, that works much like a firewall, and
then add proactive recovery to it. After, a replicated ver-
sion is built using the protocols described in this paper. The
replicated version can be built using virtual machines in the
same host or different physical machines. These two de-
signs can be later extended to consider additional replicas
and maintain the system liveness even when some replicas
are recovering. All these different designs are discussed in
more detail in Section 3.7.
In this paper, we address the problem of designing an
intrusion-tolerant distributed firewall. Other complex ques-
tions related with the CRUTIAL security architecture, like
policy dissemination and consistency between different CIS
in the same security domain, was left as future work.
3 CIS Intrusion Tolerance
In this section we describe the design of the intrusion-
tolerant CIS, starting with the design rationale and with the
definition of the algorithms it executes, then we present
some considerations on how to support statefull firewalls,
and finally we describe different ways of implementing a
CIS offering different levels of guarantees in terms of criti-
cality and overhead.
3.1 Design Rationale
To understand the rationale of the design of the
intrusion-tolerant CIS, consider the problem of implement-
ing a replicated firewall between a non-trusted WAN and the
trusted LAN that we want to protect. Further assume that
we wish to ensure that only the correct messages (according
to the deployed policy) go from the WAN side, through the
CIS, to the station computers2 in the LAN. A first problem
is that the traffic has to be received by all n replicas, instead
of only 1 (as in a normal firewall), so that they can perform
their active replication mechanisms. A second problem is
that up to f replicas can be faulty and behave maliciously,
both towards other replicas and towards the station comput-
ers.
Our solution to the first problem is to use a device (e.g.,
an Ethernet hub) to broadcast the traffic to all replicas.
2Station computers in SCADA/PCS networked systems are the front-
ends of control devices.
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These verify whether the messages comply with the OrBAC
policy and do a vote, approving the messages if and only if
at least f +1 different replicas vote in favor. A message ap-
proved by the CIS is then forwarded to its destination by a
distinguished replica, the leader, so there is no unnecessary
traffic multiplication inside the LAN. The attentive reader
will identify three problems, addressed later in the paper:
dealing with omissions in the broadcast; ensuring that there
is always one and only one leader; and that it is correct.
The existence of faulty replicas is usually addressed with
masking protocols of the Byzantine type, which extract the
correct result from the n replicas, despite f maliciously
faulty: only messages approved by f + 1 replicas should
go through (one of which must be correct since at most f
can be faulty). Since the result must be sent to the station
computers, either it is consolidated at the source, or at the
destination.
The simplest and most usual approach is to implement a
front-end in the destination host that accepts a message if:
(1) f + 1 different replicas send it; or (2) the message has
a certificate showing that f + 1 replicas approve it [5]; or
(3) the message has a signature generated by f +1 replicas
using a threshold cryptography scheme [14]. This would
imply modifying the hosts’s software. However, modify-
ing the software of the SCADA/PCS system can be com-
plicated, and the traffic inside the protected LAN would be
multiplied by n in certain cases (every replica would send
the message to the LAN), so this solution is undesirable.
So we should turn ourselves to consolidating at the
source, and sending only one, but correct, forwarded mes-
sage, in a way similar to an active replication scheme of
Delta-4 [11]. However, what is innovative here is that
source-consolidation mechanisms should be transparent to
the (standard) station computers. Moreover, a faulty replica
(leader or not) has access to the LAN (contrarily to the pro-
posal of [11] where only the fail-silent adapters had access
to the LAN) so it can send incorrect traffic to the station
computers, which typically can not distinguish faulty from
correct replicas. This makes consolidation at the source a
hard problem.
The solution to the second problem lies on using IPSEC,
a set of standard protocols that are expected to be gener-
alized in SCADA/PCS systems, according to best practice
recommendations from expert organizations and govern-
ments [29]. Henceforth, we assume that the IPSEC Au-
thentication Header (AH) protocol [23] runs both in the
station computers and in the CIS replicas. The basic idea
is that station computers will only accept messages with
a valid IPSEC/AH Message Authentication Code (MAC),
which can only be produced if the message is approved by
f + 1 different replicas. However, IPSEC/AH MACs are
generated using a shared key3 K and a hash function, so it
3We assume that IPSEC/AH is used with manual key manage-
is not possible to use threshold cryptography. As the at-
tentive reader will note, the shared key storage becomes a
vulnerability point that can not be overlooked in a high re-
silience design, therefore, there must be some secure com-
ponent that stores the shared key and produces MACs for
messages approved by f +1 replicas.
As a final facet of our design, in order to ensure perpetual
correctness we employ proactive recovery, which avoids re-
source exhaustion due to accidental or malicious corruption
of components [35]. The idea is simple: components are
periodically rejuvenated to remove the effects of malicious
attacks/faults. If the rejuvenation is performed sufficiently
often, then an attacker is unable to corrupt enough resources
to break the system. Therefore, using proactive recovery
we can increase the resilience of the replicated CIS: an un-
bounded number of intrusions may occur during its lifetime,
as long as no more than f occur between rejuvenations.
Given that proactive recovery can only be implemented with
synchrony assumptions [36, 35], a final catch is that there
must be some local secure and timely component responsi-
ble for triggering and executing periodic recoveries.
The requirements in the previous two paragraphs, for
secure and/or timely components in an otherwise asyn-
chronous and Byzantine-on-failure environment, call for a
hybrid architecture that includes a distributed secure and
timely wormhole [39]. This wormhole can be deployed as a
set of local trustworthy components (one per replica) con-
nected by a separate control channel. Figure 2 depicts the
intrusion-tolerant CIS architecture.
Figure 2. Intrusion-tolerant CIS architecture.
Each CIS replica is deployed in a different operating sys-
tem (e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, Windows XP), and the operat-
ing systems are configured to use different passwords and
different internal firewalls (e.g., iptables, ipf, Windows fire-
wall). The wormhole (represented by the small W boxes) is
synchronous and secure enough that it can trigger the proac-
ment [24].
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tive recovery on time and execute a simple voting protocol
that produces a MAC for a message if at least f +1 replicas
approved it (if the wormhole is secure, no malicious replica
can force it to sign an unapproved message). Moreover,
the wormhole also simplifies the election of a new leader,
as discussed later. A final feature of the wormhole has to
do with recovery. As already said in the introduction, in
this paper we extend the proactive recovery model to sup-
port also reactive recovery: when the wormhole recognizes
a replica as faulty, it recovers the replica as soon as possi-
ble, ensuring nevertheless that there is always an amount of
replicas to sustain system’s correct operation.
A second traffic replication device (see figure, right hand
side) is used precisely for the replicas to receive whatever
the others send to the LAN. When a (correct) replica be-
lieves that another replica is faulty (e.g., if it sends non-
approved messages to the LAN, or it is the leader and does
not forward approved messages), this replica is suspected to
be faulty. When a quorum of replicas suspect some replica,
it is recovered.
The CIS does not provide exactly-once semantics, i.e.,
messages can be lost when the traffic is high and the recep-
tion buffers of the replicas become full, or when the leader
is recovered. This is not different from firewalls, except
that the CIS operation is more complex so the throughput
is expected to be lower. However, it is important to notice
that almost all wide area control protocols, and specially
the ones designed for Power Systems like ICCP [21] and
IEC 61850 [22], are designed on top of TCP, which ensures
reliable communication even if the network (in this case the
CIS) loses messages.
3.2 System Model
The system is composed by n CIS replicas CIS =
{CIS1, ...,CISn}. These replicas are deployed in the inter-
section between the WAN and the LAN in such a way that
all data crossing the boundaries of one of these networks
must pass through the CIS. The hybrid system model en-
compasses two parts [39]: the payload and the wormhole.
Payload. Asynchronous system with n≥ 2 f +1 replicas in
which at most f can be subject to Byzantine failures in a
given recovery period. If a replica does not fail between
two recoveries it is said to be correct, otherwise it is said
to be faulty. Every CIS replica has a local clock which is
assumed only to make progress. These clocks are not syn-
chronized. We assume fault independence for the replicas,
i.e., the probability of a replica be compromised is indepen-
dent of another replica failure. This assumption can be sub-
stantiated in practice using several kinds of diversity [28].
Some concerns about this issue are presented in Section 4.
Finally, we assume also that the station computers can not
be compromised4.
Wormhole. Synchronous subsystem W = {W1, ...,Wn} in
which at most fc ≤ f local wormholes can fail by crash. We
assume that when a local wormhole Wi crashes, the corre-
sponding payload replica CISi crashes together. The control
channel used by the wormhole is isolated and synchronous,
offering reliable multicast semantics. Each local wormhole
and the station computers share a symmetric key K, and the
station computers only accept messages authenticated using
this key.
Networks. Besides the CIS replicas model, we have to de-
fine the assumptions underlying LAN and WAN commu-
nication. We consider that the messages that arrive at CIS
replicas both from the WAN and the LAN have unreliable
fair multicast semantics, an adaptation of the fair links ab-
straction to multicast: if a message is multicasted infinitely
many times it will be received by all its receivers infinitely
many times. The two primitives offered by this service are:
U-multicast(G,m), to multicast a message m to the group
G, and U-receive(G,m), to receive m that was multicast to
G. This is substantiated in practice by the traffic replication
devices. We assume that all communication between repli-
cas and other machines from the WAN and the LAN are
based in these primitives. For the LAN, we assume also that
communication is source-authenticated and the sender of a
message m is denoted by sender(m). Later we will show
how these assumptions were substantiated in our prototype.
Cryptography. The MACs used in IPSEC/AH are as-
sumed to inherit the collision resistance property from the
hash functions in which they are based [29], i.e., that it is
infeasible to find two messages that for a key K have the
same MAC.
3.3 Service Properties
First of all, let us define the concept of legal message:
a message is said to be legal if it is in accordance with the
current deployed policy P. A message not in accordance
with P is said to be illegal. Moreover, a message is said
to be processed by its destination machine if its content is
delivered to the application layer (e.g., the SCADA system).
The basic properties offered by the CIS are the following:
• Validity: A legal message received by at least one cor-
rect CIS replica that is not recovered for long enough,
is forwarded to its destination;
• Integrity: An illegal message is never processed by its
destination machine.
4It is the trusted network that we aim to protect. Moreover, it does not
make sense to protect something that can be compromised and attack the
firewall.
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Notice that these two properties are sufficiently weak to
be satisfied by a system with unreliable fair multicast com-
munication and strong enough to ensure that only legal mes-
sages will be processed at LAN hosts. The notion of a cor-
rect CIS replica not being recovered for “long enough” is
formalized in Appendix A. It captures the idea that if only
one correct replica receives the message and is recovered
immediately after, the message is lost and is not forwarded.
Notice that this type of property is a consequence of using
proactive and reactive recovery. Any system enhanced with
this type of recovery mechanisms will need to do something
useful in the interval within recoveries, or else the system
will be always recovering without executing any of its func-
tionalities.
The two properties described above are satisfied in a sys-
tem with n CIS replicas if the maximum number of faulty
replicas in a given recovery period is t ≤ f .
3.4 Message Processing Algorithm
This section presents the main algorithm executed by the
CIS to process messages incoming from the WAN to the
protected LAN. The same algorithm is used to handle mes-
sages coming from the opposite direction (possibly with a
more relaxed policy).
The policy verification is made in a policy engine ac-
cessed through the function PolEng verify.
Wormhole interface. The interactions between a replica
CISi and its local wormhole Wi are made through a well
defined interface, offering the following services:
• W sign(m): returns a MAC of message m obtained
with the shared key K, if and only if at least f +1 CIS
replicas call W sign(m) in their local wormholes;
• W verify(mσ ): returns true if σ is a MAC of m pro-
duced with K, and false otherwise;
• W leader(): returns the id of the current leader replica;
• W suspect silent( j) and W suspect malicious( j): no-
tify the wormhole, respectively, that the replica CIS j
appears to be silent or that the replica CIS j executed
some malicious action. If f + 1 replicas suspect of
CIS j, it is recovered. This recovery can be done imme-
diately, without availability concerns, in the presence
of at least f +1 malicious suspicions, given that in this
case at least one correct replica detected that replica
CIS j executed some malicious action. However, if the
number of malicious suspicions is less than f +1 , i.e.,
if some of the suspicions are of the silent type, then
replica CIS j may be correct. Therefore, the recovery
needs to be coordinated with the periodic proactive re-
coveries in order to guarantee that a minimum number
of correct replicas is always available. This mecha-
nism will be explained in Section 3.5.2. Moreover, if
the replica to be recovered is the leader, a new one is
elected by the wormhole.
Algorithm 1 CIS payload (replica CISi).
{Parameters}
integer Tvote {Expected time to vote a message}
integer Ot {Omission threshold for the leader}
integer Tforward {Expected time to forward a message}
{Variables}
integer leader = 0 {Current leader}
integer leader omissions = 0 {Leader omissions counter}
set Voting =∅ {Messages being voted}
set Pending =∅ {Not yet forwarded messages}
set TooEarly =∅ {Messages forwarded before their arrival}
upon U-receive(WAN,m)
1: if PolEng verify(m) then
2: Voting← Voting∪{m}
3: σ ←W sign(m)
4: Voting← Voting\{m}
5: if mσ ∈ TooEarly then
6: TooEarly← TooEarly\{mσ}
7: else
8: Pending← Pending∪{mσ}
9: if leader = i then U-multicast(LAN,mσ ) end if
10: end if
11: end if
upon U-receive(LAN,mσ )
12: if mσ ∈ Pending then
13: Pending← Pending\{mσ}
14: else if W verify(mσ ) then
15: TooEarly← TooEarly∪{mσ}
16: else
17: W suspect malicious(sender(mσ ))
18: end if
for each Tvote time units that Voting 6=∅
19: U-multicast(WAN,Voting)
for each Tforward time units that mσ ∈ Pending
20: U-multicast(WAN,m)
21: leader omissions← leader omissions+1
22: if leader omissions>Ot then W suspect silent(leader)end if
upon leader 6= W leader()
23: leader←W leader()
24: leader omissions← 0
25: if leader = i then
26: for all mσ ∈ Pending do
27: U-multicast(LAN,mσ )
28: end for
29: end if
The Algorithm. The CIS replicas execute Algorithm 1.
There are three parameters: Tvote, the expected time re-
quired to receive, vote and sign a legal message; Ot, the
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omission threshold, i.e., the maximum number of omissions
of a leader before it is suspected; and Tforward, the expected
time required for the leader to forward a message to the sta-
tion computer. Additionally, the algorithm uses five vari-
ables: leader, the id of the current leader; leader omissions,
a counter that stores how many times the current leader did
not forward some message; Voting, the set of messages be-
ing voted; Pending, the set of messages received and ap-
proved by the replica that were already signed by the worm-
hole but not forwarded by the leader to the station computer;
and TooEarly, the set of correctly signed messages for-
warded by the leader but not yet received (from the WAN)
by the replica.
The algorithm begins when a replica receives a message
coming from the WAN (lines 1-11). If the received message
is legal, all correct replicas will approve it (line 1) and sign
it using the wormhole W sign service (line 3). While the
message is being voted and signed by the wormhole, it is
stored in the Voting set (lines 2 and 4). Then, the message
is inserted in the Pending set (line 8) and it stays in this set
until it is received in the LAN (lines 12-13). Finally, if the
replica is the leader, it forwards it to the LAN (line 9).
The algorithm contains several controls to deal with mes-
sage losses, replica failures and abnormal message order-
ing. The first of these controls deals with message omis-
sions on the WAN: when a replica receives and approves
a message m, it stores it in the Voting set (line 2) before
requesting the wormhole to sign it. The message is re-
moved from the set when the message is signed (line 4).
For each Tvote time units that Voting is not empty, its con-
tent is multicasted to the network (line 19). This ensures
that the message being voted will eventually be received by
other correct CIS replicas (due to the fairness assumption).
The most important problem that the replicas must deal with
is the failure of the leader. The leader can fail maliciously,
forwarding illegal messages to the LAN, or in benign way,
crashing, staying silent or even being too slow. In the first
case, the illegal message diffusion will be perceived by cor-
rect replicas that will verify that this message is not pend-
ing (line 12) and was not correctly signed (line 14). Since
we assume that the LAN traffic is source-authenticated, the
wormhole will suspect the leader and recover it (line 17).
There is also a counter to deal with leader crashes and omis-
sions (lines 20-22). For each Tforward that a message stays in
the Pending set, it is retransmitted in the WAN and an omis-
sion counter is increased (lines 20-21). When this counter is
greater than Ot, the leader is suspected (line 22). With this
mechanism, if the leader crashes (or stays silent), it eventu-
ally will omit more than Ot messages, be suspected by all
correct replicas and recovered. It is possible that the leader
forwards a correctly signed message to the LAN without
some replicas having received it from the WAN. In order
to deal with these “early messages” on the LAN, we use
the TooEarly set. When a not pending legal message is re-
ceived in the LAN, it will be stored in this set (lines 14-15)
and stay there until it is received from the WAN (lines 5-
6). This control is used to ensure that an already forwarded
message will not stay pending forever in some replica.
When a new leader is elected by the wormhole, all repli-
cas will discover it and the new leader will forward all mes-
sages in its Pending set to the LAN (lines 23-29).
The proof of correctness of this algorithm is presented in
Appendix A. The algorithm is composed of five code blocks
and in our proofs we assume that each of these blocks is
executed by a different thread. Moreover, we assume the
existence of synchronization mechanisms that manage the
concurrent access of the various threads to the shared vari-
ables. We chose to not include such mechanisms explicitly
in the algorithm in order to ease its readability. These con-
siderations apply also to the remaining algorithms presented
in this paper.
3.5 Wormhole
In this section we present the algorithms executed in-
side the CIS wormhole. These algorithms are executed as
threads in a real-time environment with a preemptive sched-
uler where static priorities are defined from 1 to 3 (priority
1 being the highest). In these algorithms we do not con-
sider explicitly the clock skew and drift, since we assume
that these deviations are compensated in the protocol para-
meters.
We start by describing the interactive services that are
directly accessed by the replica payload (i.e., by Algorithm
1), then explain the proactive-reactive recovery service.
3.5.1 Interactive Services
The interactive services are presented in Algorithm 2. The
shared key K (see Section 3.2) is used as a parameter in
some services. Moreover, the services provided by each
local wormhole Wi use four variables: current leader stores
the id of the current leader; V is a vector of sets in that
each set V [σ ] stores the ids of the replicas that are currently
approving the message with MAC σ ; and the sets Suspectm
and Suspects contain the processes that suspect replica i of
being, respectively, malicious or silent.
W sign(m) calculates the MAC σ of m using the shared
key K and then sends this MAC in a VOTE message to all
local wormholes (lines 1-2). When such a message is re-
ceived, the id of its sender is inserted in set V [σ ] (line 5).
After the reception of f +1 messages containing σ (line 3),
this MAC is returned to the client (line 4). It ensures that
the message was approved by at least one correct replica, so
it is legal.
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Algorithm 2 Wormhole interactive services (local w. Wi).
{Parameters}
key K {Service Symmetric key – used for authentication}
{Variables}
integer current leader = n {Current leader wormhole}
set ∀σ : V [σ ] =∅ {Processes approving message with hash h}
set Suspectm =∅ {Processes suspecting me of being malicious}
set Suspects =∅ {Processes suspecting me of being silent}
{All interactive service threads with priority 3}
service W sign(m)
1: σ ←MAC(m,K)
2: R-multicast(W,〈VOTE, i,σ〉)
3: wait until |V [σ ]| ≥ f +1
4: return σ
upon R-receive(W,〈VOTE, j,σ〉)
5: V [σ ]←V [σ ]∪{ j}
service W verify(mσ )
6: return MAC(m,K) = σ
service W leader()
7: return current leader
service W suspect silent( j)
8: send( j,〈SUSPECT-SILENT〉)
service W suspect malicious( j)
9: send( j,〈SUSPECT-MALICIOUS〉)
upon receive( j,〈SUSPECT-SILENT〉)
10: Suspects← Suspects∪{ j}
upon receive( j,〈SUSPECT-MALICIOUS〉)
11: Suspectm← Suspectm∪{ j}
W verify(mσ ) receives as input a message m allegedly
signed with K. Returns true if the MAC for m obtained
using K corresponds to σ , and false otherwise (line 6).
W leader() returns the id of the current leader (line 7).
W suspect silent( j) and W suspect malicious( j)
send, respectively, a SUSPECT-SILENT or
SUSPECT-MALICIOUS message to Wj (lines 8-9).
When a local wormhole Wi receives such a message from
Wj, j is inserted in one of the Suspect sets according to the
type of the message (lines 10-11). The content of these sets
may trigger a recovery procedure, as explained in the next
section.
3.5.2 The Proactive-Reactive Recovery Service
Proactive-reactive recovery initiates recoveries both period-
ically (time-triggered) and whenever something bad is de-
tected or suspected (event-triggered). Periodic recoveries
R1, ...,Ri, ...,Rn are done in sequence, so no more than one
CIS replica is restarting at the same time. However, the
interval between these recoveries is not tight. Instead we al-
locate f intervals for recovery between periodic recoveries
such that they can be used by event-triggered recoveries.
Algorithm 3 presents an implementation of this service,
which uses two main parameters: TP and TD. TP defines
the maximum time interval between consecutive triggering
of the recover procedure; and TD defines the worst case ex-
ecution time of the a recovery. In Appendix B we prove
that under these assumptions the system operates correctly
perpetually.
The approach is based on real-time scheduling with an
aperiodic server task to model aperiodic tasks [37]. The
idea is to consider the recovery as the resource and ensure
that no more than one correct replica will be restarting si-
multaneously. This condition is important to ensure that the
system always stays available. Two types of real-time tasks
are utilized by the proposed mechanism:
• task Ri: represents the recovery of node CISi. All these
tasks have worst case execution time TD and period TP;
• task A: is the aperiodic server task, which can handle
at most f recoveries every time it is activated. This
task has worst case execution time f TD and period ( f +
1)TD.
Task Ri is executed at local wormhole Wi, while task A
is executed in all wormholes, but only the ones with the
payload suspected of being faulty are recovered. The time
needed for executing one A and one Ri is called the recovery
slot i and is denoted by Tslot. Every slot i has f recovery
subslots belonging to the A task, each one denoted by Sip,
plus a Ri. Figure 3 illustrates how time-triggered periodic
and event-triggered aperiodic recoveries are combined.
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Figure 3. Recovery schedule.
Notice that a reactive recovery only needs to be
scheduled according to the described mechanism if
the replica CISi to recover is not assuredly mali-
cious, i.e., if less than f + 1 replicas have called
W suspect malicious(i) (but at least f + 1 repli-
cas have called either W suspect malicious(i) or
W suspect silent(i)). If the wormhole Wi knows with
certainty that replica CISi is faulty, i.e., if a minimum of
f + 1 replicas have called W suspect malicious(i), CISi
can be recovered without extra care, since it is accounted
as one of the f faulty replicas.
The proactive-reactive recovery service is presented in
Algorithm 3. This algorithm uses five variables: tlast stores
the instant when the last periodic recovery was triggered
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by local wormhole Wi; the Crashed set stores the id of the
crashed replicas (at most fc); current leader, Suspectm, and
Suspects, correspond to the variables with the same name in
Algorithm 2.
The proactive recovery() procedure is triggered by each
local wormhole Wi at boot time (lines 1-7). It starts by call-
ing a routine that (i.) synchronizes the clocks of the local
wormholes with the goal of creating a virtual global clock,
and (ii.) blocks until all local wormholes call it and can start
at the same time (line 1). The primitive global clock() re-
turns the current value of the global clock. After the initial
synchronization, the variable tlast is initialized (line 2) in
a way that local wormholes trigger periodic recoveries ac-
cording to their id order, and the first periodic recovery trig-
gered by every local wormhole is finished within TP from
the execution of line 1. After this initialization, the pro-
cedure enters an infinite loop where a periodic recovery is
triggered within TP from the last triggering (lines 3-7).
Reactive recoveries can be triggered in two ways:
(1) if the local wormhole Wi receives at least f + 1
SUSPECT-MALICIOUS messages, then recovery is ini-
tiated immediately (line 8); (2) otherwise, if f + 1
SUSPECT-MALICIOUS or SUSPECT-SILENT messages
arrive, then replica i is at best silent. In both cases, the f +1
bound ensures that at least one correct CIS detected a prob-
lem with replica i. In the silence scenario, recovery does not
have to be started immediately because the replica might
only be slow. Instead, the aperiodic task finds the closest
slot where the replica can be recovered without endangering
the availability of the replicated CIS. The idea is to allocate
one of the (reactive) recovery subslots depicted in Figure 3.
This is done through the function allocate subslot() (line
9 – explained later). Notice that if the calculated subslot
S jp is located in the slot where the replica will be proac-
tively recovered, i.e., if j = i, then the replica does not need
to be reactively recovered (line 10). If this is not the case,
then Wi waits for the allocated subslot and then recovers the
corresponding replica (lines 11-12). Notice that the expres-
sion global clock() mod TP returns the time elapsed since
the beginning of the current period, i.e., the position of the
current global time instant in terms of the time diagram pre-
sented in Figure 3.
The recover() procedure (lines 14-22) starts by check-
ing if the current leader is going to be recovered. If this
is the case, a new leader is elected and this information is
sent to all local wormholes (lines 15-16). The leader elec-
tion is done through a deterministic local algorithm (i.e.,
no distributed communication is needed) that calculates the
replica most recently rejuvenated through a periodic recov-
ery (lines 23-27). After leader election, the payload oper-
ating system (OS) is shutdown (line 18). Then, the OS and
CIS codes are restored (e.g., from a read-only medium such
as a Read-Only-Memory or a write-protected hard disk),
and finally the OS is booted from the clean code, bring-
ing the replica to a correct state (lines 19-20). We assume
that the local CIS replica code is automatically started once
the OS finishes the booting process. The last two lines of the
recover() procedure re-initialize some variables because the
CIS replica is now assuredly correct (lines 21-22).
The protocol deals also with the crash of at most
fc wormholes (and, consequently, the corresponding CIS
replicas). These events are detected by a perfect failure de-
tector that can be easily implemented in a crash-prone syn-
chronous system. When a leader is detected to be crashed,
its id is added to the Crashed set and a new leader is elected
(lines 29-30). Notice that the leader election procedure does
not elect leader a crashed replica (lines 24-25).
Subslot management is based on a simple state machine
replication scheme (lines 34-36). A subslot is allocated by
Wi by invoking the function allocate subslot(), which sends
an ALLOC message using total order multicast (line 34) to
all local wormholes and waits until this message is received.
At this point the function local allocate subslot(i) is called
and the next available subslot is allocated to the replica (line
36). Total order multicast ensures that all local wormholes
allocate the same subslots in the same order (line 37). The
exact algorithm of the local allocate subslot(i) function is
not presented in order to ease the readability of the overall
algorithm. The goal of local allocate subslot(i) is to man-
age the various recovery subslots and to assign them to the
replicas that request to be recovered.
Notice that the CIS may become unavailable during a
recovery if f replicas (different from the one that is being
proactively recovered) are faulty [34]. In order to avoid this
unavailability problem, the CIS should tolerate the “pseudo-
crash” provoked by a recovery. Therefore, given that CIS
replicas recover in sequence, one at a time (formally proved
in Appendix B), we need n ≥ 2 f + 2 replicas in order to
guarantee availability during recoveries. This lower-bound
results from applying the reasoning presented in [34] to
CIS: if one assumes that at most k replicas recover at the
same time, n≥ 2 f + k+1 replicas will be needed to ensure
CIS availability.
3.6 Supporting Statefull Firewalls
The CIS design applies to stateless firewalls, which is
largely the most common type of firewall used. How-
ever, some applications require statefull security policies,
in which traffic is approved or denied taking into consider-
ation the messages approved/denied in the past (e.g., some
data message is only forwarded if some connection message
was sent before). As already said, several critical infrastruc-
tures applications are not secure-aware and must rely on ex-
ternal protection mechanisms (like the CIS) for its security.
Such applications need statefull firewalls in order to enforce
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Algorithm 3 Wormhole proactive-reactive recovery service (local wormhole Wi).
{Parameters}
integer TP {Periodic recovery period}
integer TD {Recovery duration time}
{Constants}
integer Tslot , ( f +1)TD {Slot duration time}
{Variables}
integer tlast = 0 {instant of the last periodic recovery start}
set Crashed =∅ {Crashed replicas (will not be recovered)}
integer current leader = n {Current leader wormhole}
set Suspectm =∅ {Processes suspecting me of being malicious}
set Suspects =∅ {Processes suspecting me of being silent}
{Periodic recovery thread with priority 1}
procedure proactive recovery()
1: synchronize global clock()
2: tlast← global clock()−TP +((i−1)Tslot + f TD)
3: loop
4: wait until global clock() = tlast +TP
5: tlast = global clock()
6: recover()
7: end loop
{Threads with priority 2}
upon |Suspectm| ≥ f +1
8: recover()
upon (|Suspectm|< f +1)∧ (|Suspects +Suspectm| ≥ f +1)
9: 〈 j, p〉 ← allocate subslot()
10: if j 6= i then
11: wait until global clock() mod TP = ( j−1)Tslot +(p−1)TD
12: recover()
13: end if
procedure recover()
14: if current leader = i then
15: elect new leader()
16: R-multicast(W,〈NEW-LEADER, i,new leader〉)
17: end if
18: shutdown OS()
19: restore code()
20: boot OS()
21: Suspectm←∅
22: Suspects←∅
procedure elect new leader()
23: new leader← last periodic recovered node()
24: while new leader ∈ Crashed do
25: new leader← ((new leader−2) mod n)+1
26: end while
27: current leader← new leader
upon R-receive(W,〈NEW-LEADER, l,new leader〉)
28: if l = current leader then current leader← new leader end if
upon current leader is faulty
29: Crashed← Crashed∪{current leader}
30: elect new leader()
procedure last periodic recovered node()
31: tround ← global clock() mod TP
32: j← (b troundTslot c mod n)
33: if j = 0 then return n else return j end if
procedure allocate subslot()
34: TO-multicast(W,〈ALLOC, i〉)
35: wait until TO-receive(W,〈ALLOC, i〉)
36: return local allocate subslot(i)
upon TO-receive(W,〈ALLOC, j〉)∧ j 6= i
37: local allocate subslot( j)
powerful security policies.
The CIS policy engine can provide statefull semantics
as long as one ensures that all messages are verified in the
same order in all CIS replicas. In other words, we need
an agreement protocol to ensure that all messages are eval-
uated in total order. This protocol could require either f
more replicas and some timing assumptions (e.g., [10]) or
the same number of replicas and a distributed secure and
timely wormhole [12] (which is already part of the design
but does not implement the required services). Moreover,
if the policy engine is statefull, its state needs to be trans-
ferred from other replicas after each recovery. State transfer
is needed because the recovering replica will not receive the
messages that pass through the firewall during the recovery
process. Additionally, the recovering replica may have been
compromised before the recovery, and it may be necessary
to transfer a clean state from remote replicas. In [10], it
is presented an efficient mechanism to perform checkpoints
and state transfer, specially tailored for replication mecha-
nisms subject to Byzantine faults.
3.7 Deployment Space
The intrusion-tolerant CIS presented in the previous sec-
tions can be implemented and deployed in several ways, de-
pending on the criticality of the LAN being protected and
the tolerance to unexpected delays of the services deployed
in this LAN. Figure 4 presents the main four design options.
In this figure it is possible to identify two main dimen-
sions in the design space. If the LAN protected by the CIS
provides a very critical service, the implementation must
be based on the use of different physical replicas for each
CIS replica, allowing tolerance to physical and software
faults. However, since price is always a major concern, a
much more cost effective solution can be attained by resort-
ing to virtualization. The various replicas are deployed in
the same host, using virtual machines (VM) to isolate the
different runtime environments, preventing intrusions from
propagating from one replica to the others. If the service
protected is part of an application with hard real-time guar-
antees, without tolerance to unexpected delays, there must
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Figure 4. Deployment space for the intrusion-
tolerant CIS.
be at least 2 f + k+ 1 replicas to ensure safe operation and
availability even in case of f faults an k recovering replicas.
On the other hand, if occasional delays are not a problem,
2 f + 1 replicas suffice to maintain correct operation of the
system. The four main options are the following:
• VMFR (Virtual Machines with Few Replicas): 2 f + 1
replicas are deployed as virtual machines running in
the same host. The system does not tolerate physical
faults or bugs in the virtual machine monitor, but offers
some level of protection if a virtual machine is subject
to an intrusion;
• VMMR (Virtual Machines with Many Replicas): There
are 2 f + k+1 logical replicas running in different vir-
tual machines. The tolerance to malicious behavior is
the same of VMFR but now the system continues to
verify and forward messages even with f faulty and k
recovering replicas;
• FPR (Few Physical Replicas): We expect this to be the
most common form of deployment, as depicted in Fig-
ure 2. There is some tolerance to accidental hardware
and software faults as well as intrusions;
• MPR (Many Physical Replicas): This is similar to FPR
but with k more replicas, to allow availability even with
faulty replicas.
These deployments can be used in different points of the
critical infrastructure to protect different applications [18].
For example, a MPR deployment can be used to protect a
critical grid defense system (e.g., Automatic Grid Separa-
tion System – that performs automatic grid separations in
emergency states) while a VMMR implementation can be
adequate to protect a substation data historian network.
4 CIS Prototype
We have chosen to implement the VMFR and VMMR
designs for two main reasons: first, our group already ex-
perimented a wormhole construction with different physi-
cal replicas [13] but to the best of our knowledge there are
no previous experiments with this kind of system deployed
in virtual machines to obtain intrusion tolerance; second, a
typical critical infrastructure has hundreds of station com-
puters and other hosts to be protected, and a solution based
on virtual machines can reduce the deployment cost5.
Our implementation is based on the XEN virtual ma-
chine monitor [3] with the Linux operating system. The
architecture is presented in Figure 5. A XEN system has
multiple layers, the lowest and most privileged of which is
XEN itself. XEN may host multiple guest operating sys-
tems, every one executed within an isolated VM or, in XEN
terminology, a domain. Domains are scheduled by XEN to
make effective use of the available physical resources (e.g.,
CPUs). Each guest OS manages its own applications. The
first domain, dom0, is created automatically when the sys-
tem boots and has special management privileges. Domain
dom0 builds other domains (dom1, dom2, dom3, ...) and
manages their virtual devices. It also performs administra-
tive tasks such as suspending and resuming other VMs, and
it can be configured to execute with higher priority than the
remaining VMs.
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Figure 5. VM-based CIS architecture.
As depicted in Figure 5, a centralized version of the
wormhole (W) was deployed in domain dom0. This version
(implemented in C) emulates the n different local worm-
holes, and each of these wormholes receives requests and
5For example, the Italian Power System contains about 1000 station
computers, thus using three machines and two hubs to protect every one
of these computers would require 3000 and 2000 extra machines and hubs,
respectively.
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sends replies to their corresponding replica. The control
channel is emulated using shared memory. In the payload
side, each replica i runs on a different domain domi. The
replica payload is composed of the policy engine, the CIS
protection service (PSi), and a Java Virtual Machine (JVM),
given that both policy engine and protection service are im-
plemented in Java. In the current prototype, the policy en-
gine is very simple, since it just checks if certain strings are
present in the received packets.
Given that the various payloads and wormhole run in
different VMs, the communication between them is done
through a virtual bridge. This bridge emulates a private pipe
between each replica and its corresponding local worm-
hole. The two remaining bridges emulate the WAN and
the LAN networks. These two bridges are configured to
operate in broadcast mode, and the LAN bridge authenti-
cates the source address of the messages sent by replicas
(i.e., replicas can only send messages using their own id)6.
This way, the authentication assumption in Section 3.2 is
substantiated.
To simplify the design and to avoid changes in the kernel,
the CIS prototype operates at the UDP level, instead of IP
level as most firewalls do. Therefore, there was no need
to implement packet interception because packets are sent
directly to the CIS. Moreover, authentication is not done at
the IP level (as when using IPSEC/AH), but in alternative
the wormhole calculates the HMAC7 of the payload UDP
packet, and then the two are concatenated. Notice that this
type of authentication implies the same type of overhead of
IP authentication.
The periodic recovery resets the state and restores the
code of a replica. While this is useful to restore the cor-
rectness of the replica, it would be interesting if we were
able to introduce diversity in the recovery process. For in-
stance, each recovery could randomize the address space of
the replica (e.g., using PAX8) in order to minimize the use-
fulness of the knowledge obtained in the past to increase the
chances of future attacks. The XEN and PAX communities
are currently making efforts to release a joint distribution,
and we plan to integrate this mechanism in the prototype
when it is available.
Domain dom0 executes with higher priority than the re-
maining VMs, but since it is based on a normal Linux OS, it
provides no real-time guarantees. Currently, only modified
versions of Linux and NetBSD can be run on dom0. How-
ever, XEN is continuously being improved and we expect
that in the near future one can use a real-time OS.
6In a physical switch, a similar effect can be attained by using the
failopen mode to force broadcast, and the switch’s access control lists to
prevent replicas from spoofing their MAC addresses, which can be used as
identifiers.
7HMAC is a standard for calculating MACs, and in the prototype we
used the SHA-1 hash function.
8Available at http://pax.grsecurity.net/.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We set up a VM-based CIS and connected it to two 100
Mbps switches representing the WAN and the LAN. A PC
emulated the station computer and, in the WAN side, two
PCs were deployed: a good sender trying to transmit le-
gal traffic to the station computer, and a malicious sender
causing a denial of service attack. The CIS executed on a
dual-processor 2.4 GHz Pentium Xeon PC with 2 GB RAM
and XEN 3.0; the good sender a 500 MHz Pentium 3 PC
with 256 MB RAM; the malicious sender a 2.8 GHz Pen-
tium 4 PC with 2 GB RAM; the station computer a 1.8 GHz
Celeron PC with 512 MB RAM. The malicious sender run
Linux 2.6.11, and the others run Linux 2.6.18. The JVM
was Sun JDK 1.5.09.
During the experiments, the malicious sender is con-
stantly injecting illegal traffic at a certain rate. The IPERF
tool9 was employed to perform this task. The good sender
transmits legal packets (of 1470 bytes) at a different rate.
In the throughput and loss rate experiments, legal packets
are sent at a rate of 124 packets/second and the obtained
results correspond to the worst case values (lowest through-
put and highest loss rate) that were observed. Notice that
this is a very high traffic for a SCADA system, since it rep-
resents, for instance, 124 MMS commands being sent to a
device per second. In the latency experiment, a legal packet
is transmitted after the arrival of an acknowledgement of the
previous packet. The displayed results correspond to the av-
erage and standard deviation values of 1000 transmissions,
after excluding the 5% most distant from the average.
Figure 6 presents the latency, throughput and loss rate
of several CIS configurations, when distinct levels of illegal
traffic were being injected in the network. The configura-
tions correspond basically to a system with different num-
ber of replicas, resulting from various values of f and k (see
Sections 3.4 and 3.5). Notice that the results for the con-
figurations stop at distinct maximum levels of illegal traffic.
This happens because after certain traffic levels, the config-
urations become unstable, leading to high latencies and/or
loss rates.
As expected, the results show that latency and mes-
sage loss increases, while throughput decreases, when the
amount of illegal traffic directed from the WAN to the LAN
becomes larger. There are no pre-established acceptable
limits for these parameters, except for the latency that in
power systems is typically satisfactory if it remains lower
than 200 milliseconds [18]. In the figure it is possible to
observe that latency stayed way below this limit for very
reasonable levels of traffic.
Comparing the maximum amount of illegal traffic that
the several configurations can deal with, one can see that
9Available at http://dast.nlanr.net/Projects/Iperf/.
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Figure 6. Experimental evaluation of the CIS prototype.
this threshold is directly proportional to the number of repli-
cas n. This happens because all replicas share the same
physical machine and, consequently, the amount of avail-
able resources has to be divided. In particular, our exper-
iments allowed us to conclude that the amount of memory
allocated for each VM is a critical factor in how much il-
legal traffic the CIS supports. For a setup with 4 replicas,
resisting 20 Mbps of illegal traffic is a good achievement,
specially if we take into account that it is very easy to limit
this traffic at the WAN gateway.
In a setup with more resources, such as one with n phys-
ical replicas, we expect that the overall behavior of the CIS
will be closer to the non-replicated case in the figure (with
a minor degradation due to the distributed implementation
of W sign). This means that the physically distributed CIS
would maintain acceptable operation even in the presence
of illegal traffic of up to 70 Mbps, which is a value close to
the network capacity, 100 Mbps. This result is even more
interesting if we consider that the CIS was implemented at
application level and not inside the kernel.
6 Related Work
Work on intrusion-tolerant services has been fundamen-
tally done considering two replication models: Byzantine
quorum systems (e.g., [26, 44]) and state machine repli-
cation (e.g., [10, 2]). The main difference between these
approaches is on the way they maintain state consistency
among the replicas: quorum systems are based on intersec-
tions between different quorums (sets of servers) while state
machine replication relies on total order multicast protocols
to ensure that all replicas evolve in the same way. Neither of
these approaches is used in the CIS algorithms. The repli-
cated CIS forwards a message if it is accepted by f +1 repli-
cas. Due to this particularity, CIS requires significantly less
replicas (n≥ 2 f +1) than the usual n≥ 3 f +1 bound.
There was also some previous research on using proac-
tive recovery to increase system resilience [44, 10, 35]. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine reac-
tive and proactive recovery in a single approach.
Some intrusion-tolerant services have been proposed in
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the past: file/storage systems [17, 10, 27], certification au-
thorities [32, 44], and DNS [9]. The only other research
that we are aware of about intrusion-tolerant firewalls is the
privacy firewall described by Yin et al. [43]. The privacy
firewall was proposed to enforce confidentiality in Byzan-
tine services. Since this objective differs from ours, the CIS
design requires much less replicas (n ≥ 2 f + 1 instead of
n≥ ( f +1)2) and does not need expensive threshold signa-
tures. Most important, the privacy firewall requires mod-
ification on both sides of the firewall, to be able to verify
approved messages, i.e., to verify if incoming messages are
correctly signed. In addition, the privacy firewall does not
recover replicas. Moreover, from the perspective of the ser-
vice provided, the CIS is closer to normal firewalls than to
the privacy firewall.
Regarding the dependability of critical infrastructures,
several works talk about how to integrate security in these
systems. Most of this research either analyzes current secu-
rity incidents (e.g., [8]) or focus on the use of traditional se-
curity mechanisms (like firewalls) to protect SCADA/PCS
systems (e.g., [6]). However, people have argued that the
critical infrastructures requirements are different from the
ones in corporate networks, and, more importantly, it has
been shown that most firewalls available today are unable
to deal with these requirements [7].
There is one project that investigates an advanced pro-
tection and communication infrastructure for critical in-
frastructures, GRIDSTAT and its successor TCIP (Trustwor-
thy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid). This project
advocates the use of a publish-subscribe infrastructure to
provide secure and QoS-enabled communications between
different control centers in a power grid. Much of the work
being developed in these projects is orthogonal to the work
presented in this paper and to the CRUTIAL project in gen-
eral, since it is focused on QoS, real-time communication,
and trust management [20].
Regarding the use of virtualisation technology to con-
struct intrusion-tolerant services, the VM-FIT architec-
ture proposed in [31] provides basic support for intrusion-
tolerant replication of services. Similarly to our VM-based
CIS prototype, VM-FIT uses virtualisation to provide a
trusted component (i.e., a wormhole) on each machine.
However, the goal of the VM-FIT wormhole is to intercept
client-service interaction and to distribute requests to the
replica group. Overall, the goal of the VM-FIT architecture
is conceptually different from the goal of CIS. VM-FIT is a
generic architecture that allows to transform any determin-
istic centralized service in an intrusion-tolerant replicated
one, whereas CIS is a specific intrusion-tolerant replicated
service.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented the CIS protection service, imple-
mented by highly resilient distributed devices, aimed at pro-
tecting critical information infrastructures. The CIS has
three distinguishing features: it is intrusion-tolerant, it seeks
unattended perpetual operation and it supports a rich access
control model that takes into account application semantics.
The design of this protection device is based on well-know
techniques – replication and proactive recovery – combined
and extended in innovative ways, to solve the non-trivial
problem of ensuring transparent intrusion-tolerant opera-
tion for standard protocols and components.
Additional results are the combination of reactive and
proactive recovery in a single approach, without losing
availability, and the first implementation of an intrusion-
tolerant service in a single machine, using logical replica-
tion based on virtual machines. Preliminary experiments
were conducted on the VM-based CIS prototype, in order to
evaluate its behavior in face of attacks. The results exhibited
an overall good performance in terms of latency, throughput
and packet loss rate. Moreover, they helped us to realize that
replication based on VMs must be used judiciously, since it
implies less resources for each individual replica.
As future work, we expect to advance our understand-
ing of the design and implementation of intrusion-tolerant
firewalls, through the evolution of the VM-based prototype
presented in this paper, and the implementation of a distrib-
uted version of CIS with physical replicas. Additionally,
we will use the protection device presented in this paper as
a building block of the CRUTIAL protection framework,
which must take into account several other issues such as
policy dissemination and consistency across different secu-
rity domains.
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A Correctness of the Payload Protocol
This appendix proves that the CIS message processing
protocol satisfies the conditions defined in Section 3.3, as-
suming the correctness of the wormhole protocols, which
we prove in Appendix B. The proof starts with a lemma
showing that the retransmission mechanism defined for the
protocol ensures that a received message eventually will be
signed.
Lemma 1 In Algorithm 1, if a legal message is received
by one correct CIS replica that is not recovered for long
enough, it will eventually be signed.
Proof (sketch): When a legal message m is received by a
correct CIS replica, it will be verified by the policy engine
(line 1), stored in the Voting set (line 2) and then passed to
the wormhole for signing (line 3). Knowing that the W sign
service of the wormhole only returns at some replica if it
is called by at least f + 1 replicas, we will show that this
call eventually returns. By the algorithm, if a replica stays
more than Tvote blocked at line 3, the retransmission of line
19 will be triggered periodically (at each Tvote time units)
until Voting=∅ (which happens only if the replica executes
line 4, after the wormhole signs the message). Since we
assume that the unreliable multicast is fair (see Section 3.2),
if a replica retransmits m many times, eventually all correct
replicas will receive it. Given that n ≥ 2 f + 1, there will
be always f +1 correct replicas that will receive m and call
W sign(m). When this happens, the wormhole will produce
the signature and return it to the payload. 
Now we present theorems for the Validity and Integrity
properties.
Theorem 1 (Validity) Algorithm 1 ensures that a legal
message received by at least one correct CIS replica that
is not recovered for long enough, is forwarded to its desti-
nation.
Proof (sketch): By Lemma 1, we know that a message m re-
ceived by some correct replica will be signed. Since a mes-
sage is signed only if f +1 processes approved it, we know
that at least one correct replica that signed m will store it
on the Pending set. The message will stay in this set until
it is received in the LAN, i.e. it was forwarded (lines 12-
14). While stored in this set m will be retransmitted period-
ically (line 19). After Ot retransmissions, the current leader
replica will be suspected (line 22). Due to the fair broad-
cast assumption, all other correct replicas eventually will
receive m and approve, sign and store it in their Pending
sets. Consequently, if the message was not forwarded by
the leader l, eventually f + 1 replicas will suspect it, and
the wormhole will change the leader replica. This proce-
dure of leader change can happen at most f times until a
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correct replica becomes the leader, forwards m, and stores
in its Pending buffer (lines 23-29).
The notion of a replica not being recovered for long
enough should now be clear. Suppose only one correct
replica CISi receives the message. In that case, CISi can
not be recovered until other correct replicas, that also are
not recovered for long enough, receive it. Notice, however,
that the normal is for all correct replicas to receive the same
messages, since the traffic replication device multicasts the
messages to all replicas. 
Theorem 2 (Integrity) Algorithm 1 ensures that an illegal
message is never processed by its destination machine.
Proof (sketch): Recall that (i.) in our system model, the des-
tination machine can not be corrupted and it only processes
messages signed with key K; and (ii.) the key K is stored in
the wormhole, and a message m is only signed with this key
if at least f + 1 CIS replicas call W sign(m). Given these
two facts, it is almost direct to see that illegal messages (ap-
proved by at most f processes) can not be signed (due to
(ii.)) and, would not be processed by their destination ma-
chines even if forwarded by a malicious leader (due to (i.)).
Consequently, an illegal message will never be processed
by its destination machine. 
B Correctness of the Wormhole Protocols
In this appendix we prove the correctness of the worm-
hole protocols.
Theorem 3 (Signature) Algorithm 2 ensures that the
W sign(m) service returns a MAC produced with the shared
key K for message m, if and only if at least f +1 CIS repli-
cas called it in their local wormholes.
Proof (sketch): When the service W sign(m) is called at a
local wormhole, it blocks until receiving a VOTE message
with the correct MAC σ (produced with the shared key K
for message m) from at least f +1 local wormholes (line 3).
A VOTE message with the correct MAC σ is sent by a local
wormhole if and only if W sign(m) is called (lines 1 and 2),
since we assume collision-resistant MACs. Consequently,
the W sign(m) service returns a MAC produced with the
shared key K for message m, if and only if at least f + 1
CIS replicas called it in their local wormholes. 
Theorem 4 (Leader Change) Algorithms 2 and 3 ensure
that a leader i is changed if at least f +1 CIS replicas call
either W suspect silent(i) or W suspect malicious(i).
Proof (sketch): Consider that replica i is the leader and that
at least f +1 CIS replicas call either W suspect silent(i) or
W suspect malicious(i). When these services are called, a
SUSPECT-SILENT or SUSPECT-MALICIOUS message is
sent to replica i. Therefore, if the services are called by at
least f +1 replicas, then at least f +1 suspect messages are
sent with different sender ids (Algorithm 2, lines 8 and 9).
The rest of the proof depends on the specific suspect service
being called.
1. If at least f + 1 replicas call W suspect malicious(i),
then at least f +1 different ids will be added to the set
Suspectm of replica i (Algorithm 2, line 11). This im-
mediately triggers the recovery of replica i (Algorithm
3, line 8). Given that replica i is the current leader, a
new leader is elected (Algorithm 3, lines 14-15).
2. If at least f + 1 replicas call either
W suspect malicious(i) or W suspect silent(i),
then at least f + 1 different ids will be added to the
union of the sets Suspectm and Suspects of replica
i (Algorithm 2, lines 10-11). This triggers the
allocation of a slot and a subslot to perform a sporadic
recovery (Algorithm 3, line 9). If the allocated slot
corresponds to the one of replica i, then it means that
replica i will be recovered through periodic proactive
recovery. Otherwise, replica i will be recovered in the
allocated slot. 
Theorem 5 (Number of Recovering Replicas) Algo-
rithms 1, 2 and 3 ensure that at most one correct replica
is recovering at any time.
Proof (sketch): Consider a replica i. A recovery can only be
triggered due to one of the following three reasons:
1. periodic proactive recovery (Algorithm 3, line 6);
2. reactive recovery because replica i is compromised
(Algorithm 3, line 8);
3. reactive recovery because replica i is suspected to be
silent (Algorithm 3, line 12).
We have to show that if replica i is recovered due to rea-
sons 1 or 3, then it is guaranteed that no other correct replica
is recovering at the same time. If replica i is recovered due
to reason 2 then it is compromised, and thus nothing has to
be proved.
If replica i is recovered due to a periodic proactive recov-
ery (reason 1), then the proactive recovery algorithm (Al-
gorithm 3, lines 1–7) guarantees that replica i always start
recoveries Tslot time units after the previous periodic recov-
ery. Given that Tslot ≥ TD and that it is assumed than TD
is the maximum recovery duration time, then it is ensured
that when a replica i starts a periodic recover, the previ-
ous periodic recovery has already finished. Moreover, the
reactive recovery algorithm (Algorithm 3, lines 9–13) guar-
antees that replica i always start recoveries at least TD time
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units after the previous reactive recovery. Therefore, it is
ensured that when a replica i starts a proactive recovery, the
previous proactive and reactive recoveries have already fin-
ished.
If replica i is recovered due to a reactive recovery be-
cause it is suspected to be silent (reason 3), then the reac-
tive recovery algorithm (Algorithm 3, lines 9–13) guaran-
tees that replica i always start recoveries at least TD time
units after the previous periodic recovery. Given that TD
is the maximum recovery duration time, then it is ensured
that when a replica i starts a reactive recovery of this nature,
the previous periodic recovery has already finished. More-
over, the reactive recovery algorithm guarantees that replica
i always start recoveries at least TD time units after the pre-
vious reactive recovery. Therefore, it is ensured that when
a replica i starts a reactive recovery because it is suspected
to be silent, the previous proactive and reactive recoveries
have already finished. 
Theorem 6 The CIS protection service is exhaustion-safe
(i.e., at most f replicas are failed at the same time) if it is
possible to lower-bound the time needed for an attacker to
produce f + 1 replica failures by a known constant Texhmin ,
and TP +TD < Texhmin .
Proof (sketch): In addition to TP and TD, the Proactive Re-
silience Model (PRM) [35] defines a third parameter Tpi ,
but it only has meaning if the recovery is a distributed pro-
cedure (with a set of nodes recovering at the same time)
and therefore it does not apply here given that CIS replicas
recover one at a time. As shown in [35], if it is possible
to lower-bound the time needed for an attacker to produce
f +1 replica failures by a known constant Texhmin , then it is
guaranteed that no more than f replicas will be faulty at the
same time as long as TP +TD < Texhmin . 
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